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RECENT DEVELOPMENT 
JONES V. STATE: PUBLIC DUTY DOCTRINE DOES NOT 
PROTECT THE STATE AGAINST A NEGLIGENCE ACTION 
FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS' INTENTIONAL 
TORTS; STANDARD OF CARE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT 
OFFICERS' FOURTH AMENDMENT TRAINING DOES NOT 
REQUIRE EXPERT TESTIMONY. 
By: Alicia L. Shelton 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that the public duty doctrine 
did not protect the State against a claim for negligent retention and 
training when its police officers committed an intentional tort. Jones v. 
State, 425 Md. 1, 38 A.3d 333 (2012). Additionally, the court held that 
expert testimony was not necessary to support a claim of negligent 
training when the relevant standard of care is common knowledge or 
easily understood by the trier of fact. Id. at 26, 38 A.3d at 348. Finally, 
the court held that there was legally sufficient evidence that the State 
negligently trained the officers based on the officers' testimony. Id. at 
32,38 AJd at 351. 
On September 15, 2006, Kimberly Jones ("Jones") awoke in her 
apartment in Greenbelt, Maryland to officers at her door asking for 
Lamarr Wallace ("Wallace"). Wallace was not a resident of the 
apartment and Jones informed the officers that he was not there. Jones 
told the officers that they could not enter the apartment. The officers 
forced their way into the apartment and, during the course of the struggle, 
punched Jones in the face, sprayed her with pepper spray, and beat her. 
On November 27, 2007, Jones filed a complaint in the Circuit Court 
for Prince George's County, alleging ten various counts against the 
officers and the State, including battery and false imprisonment. Jones 
amended the complaint to include negligent training and supervision by 
the State. At trial, the officers testified that they attended the police 
academy, received annual training, completed yearly re-certification, and 
the Prince George's County Sheriffs Office was responsible for keeping 
them abreast of Fourth Amendment standards for search and arrest 
procedures. At the close of Jones's case, the State moved for summary 
judgment on the grounds that the officers did not owe an individual duty 
to Jones, and that Jones failed to establish that the officers' training 
deviated from Fourth Amendment or otherwise acceptable standards. 
The circuit court denied the motion for summary judgment and the jury 
found the State liable for negligent training and retention. 
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The State appealed to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, again 
alleging that the officers did not owe a duty to Jones and that Jones failed 
to establish that the officers' training deviated from Fourth Amendment 
or otherwise acceptable standards. The intermediate appellate court 
reversed, holding that Jones failed to establish the necessary standard of 
care for negligent training because she did not provide expert testimony. 
The Court of Special Appeals decided the case on the sufficiency of 
evidence for the standard of reasonable care and did not address the 
public duty doctrine argument. Jones petitioned for a writ of certiorari, 
which the Court of Appeals of Maryland granted. 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland began its analysis by addressing 
the State's argument that the public duty doctrine shielded it from Jones's 
claim of negligent training. Jones, 425 Md. at 20, 38 A.3d at 344. The 
court pointed out that under the public duty doctrine, the duty owed by 
police officers is one to protect the public at large and is not enforceable 
as a duty to a particular individual. Jones, 425 Md. at 20, 38 A.3d at 344 
(citing Muthukumarana v. Montgomery Cnty., 370 Md. 447,486-87, 805 
A.2d 372, 395 (2002)). The public duty doctrine provides that a police 
officer is not liable to an individual for harms incurred when the officer is 
in the role of protecting the individual from third-party inflicted or private 
harms. Jones, 425 Md. at 23, 38 A.3d at 346 (citing Ashburn v. Anne 
Arundel Cnty., 306 Md. 617,628,510 A.2d 1078,1083). 
The court noted that it had not previously determined if the public 
duty doctrine applied when the officer involved, rather than a third party, 
directly caused the injury. Jones, 425 Md. at 24, 38 A.3d at 346-47. In 
addressing the issue, the court relied on the reasoning of other 
jurisdictions, which held that the public duty doctrine only applied when 
there was an allegation that the officer failed to protect the individual 
from a third party injury. Jones, 425 Md. at 23-24, 38 A.3d at 346-47 
(citing Strickland v. Univ. of N.c. at Wilmington, 712 S.E.2d 888, 892 
(N.C. Ct. App. 2011), review denied, 720 S.E.2d 677 (N.C. 2012)). 
In addition to other jurisdictions' holdings, the court also considered 
the public policy rationale behind the public duty doctrine. Jones, 425 
Md. at 25-26, 38 A.3d at 347. The court noted that if the police owed a 
duty to every individual for an alleged failure to respond, it would 
pressure officers to make hasty decisions and would unduly burden the 
judicial system. Jones, 425 Md. at 21, 38 A.3d at 344-45 (citing 
Ashburn, 306 Md. at 629-30, 510 A.2d at 1084). The court concluded 
that when the officer directly caused the injury, the public policy 
concerns are not as significant. Jones, 425 Md. at 24, 38 A.3d at 347 
(citing District of Columbia v. Evans, 644 A.2d 1008, 1017 n.8 (D.C. 
1994)). The court held that because Jones's claim of negligent training 
resulted from direct injurious action by the officers, the public duty 
doctrine was not a defense. Jones, 425 Md. at 25-26, 38 A.3d at 347. 
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Next, the court considered whether Jones had to provide expert 
testimony to establish the requisite standard of care in her claim for 
negligent training. Jones, 425 Md. at 26-28, 38 A.3d at 347. The court 
emphasized that experts are usually required to establish a relevant 
standard of care in negligence cases unless the standard of care is 
obvious, easily understood, or common knowledge. Jones, 425 Md. at 
26,38 A.3d at 347-48 (citing Schultz v. Bank of Am., 413 Md. 15,29,990 
A.2d 1078, 1087 (2010)). In this instance, the court detennined that the 
Fourth Amendment established the standard of care in a claim for 
negligent training. Jones, 425 Md. at 27, 38 A.3d at 348. The court 
concluded that because the trial judge properly instructed the jury as to 
the constitutionally established standard during jury instructions, the jury 
possessed sufficient "common knowledge or experience" so that Jones 
did not need to present expert testimony. Id. at 28,38 A.3d at 349. 
The final issue addressed by the court was whether Jones provided 
legally sufficient evidence to establish that the State negligently trained 
the officers. Jones, 425 Md. at 28, 38 A.3d at 349. The court first noted 
that an officer can enter a third party's home with a search warrant, but 
cannot enter a third party's home with an arrest warrant, even if the 
officer believed the subject was inside. Jones, 425 Md. at 29,33,38 A.3d 
at 349, 351 (citing Steagaldv. United States, 451 U.S. 204,211 (1981)). 
The court looked directly to the testimony of the officers to establish 
negligence because there was no dispute that the State had a duty to train 
its officers in Fourth Amendment rules for executing arrest and search 
warrants. Jones, 425 Md. at 30, 38 A.3d at 350. The court concluded 
that the officers' testimony demonstrated the requisite "slight evidence" 
to support Jones's claim. Id. at 32,39 A.3d at 351. 
In Jones, the Court of Appeals of Maryland established that the State 
and its officers could not use the public duty doctrine as a defense for 
intentional torts. The State has a duty to individuals and can be liable to 
individuals if they can demonstrate injury by officers. This ruling could 
have significant fiscal impacts on the State by allowing recovery in tort 
claims for negligent training, and could open the door to recovery in other 
actions, such as negligent supervision. If the State cannot use the public 
duty doctrine as a defense in these claims, it could frequently be found 
liable or might be forced to settle claims that it otherwise might have 
defended. In the future, the State can insulate itself from costly litigation 
by investing in preventative measures such as additional officer training 
on Fourth Amendment procedures, department hiring practices, and 
management skills. 
